The U.N. standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners and North Korea: how North Korea is violating these rules with its operation of the Yodok concentration camp by Papain, Tom Theodore
doi: 10.5102/rdi.v10i2.2284 The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners and North Korea: How 
North Korea is Violating these Rules with its 
Operation of the Yodok Concentration Camp1*
Tom Theodore Papain**
AbstrAct
The aim of  this paper is to analyze how North Korea is violating the 
“U.N. Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners”, the international 
authority on how U.N. countries treat their prisoners, with its operation of  
the Yodok concentration camp, and how the International Community can 
apply pressure on North Korea to close this camp.With this in mind, first it 
provides the international definitions of  “torture” and “cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading punishment”, as well as some notable examples of  torture and 
relevant international human rights case law.  Then, it analyzes the “U.N. 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners”, and how North Korea is 
violating these Rules with their continued operation of  Yodok. Finally, It 
analyses the action of  formal international bodies to try to convince North 
Korea to either change the conditions of  confinement for its prisoners in 
Yodok, or to shut down the camp entirely, as well as North Korea’s response 
to this international pressure. It concludes that these formal attempts at per-
suading North Korea to close down Yodok have not worked, and have had 
the unwanted effect of  both angering the North Korean government and of  
further fermenting North Korea’s anti-international sentiment.  In the end, 
it suggest ways in which the International Community can put pressure on 
North Korea to close the Yodok camp, and provides original examples of  
how we can stop this concentration camp from existing in the future, with 
the help of  both formal U.N. bodies and independent organizations.
1. introduction
Nine-year old Kang Chol-hwan and his family arrived at the Yodok con-
centration camp after a long and tumultuous van ride, knowing little about 
where they were going or what exactly they had done wrong.2  The grand-
mother, who had attended every Party meeting and assembly and showed 
only the utmost loyalty to Kim Il-Sung and the Revolutionary cause, felt be-
trayed by the State which she had devoted her entire life to, while her youn-
1  Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Professor Martha Rayner of  Fordham Univer-
sity School of  Law for overseeing the research and drafting of  this paper.  I would also like 
to thank Professor Eric Jensen, whose confidence in my writing has motivated me to try and 
publish my work with international law journals.  Last but certainly not least, I would like 
to thank my mother and father, who have read all three of  my papers on North Korea, and 
have provided me with an endless supply of  love and support pivotal to any success I have 
enjoyed.
2  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  Pyongyang 46-8 (Basic Books, 
New York 2005).
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gest grandson Kang could not help but bawl over the 
prospect of  losing his most prized and exotic fish.3 
Once Kang climbed out of  the van with his family, 
however, he began to realize that the survival of  his fish 
would be the least of  his problems:
The guards [then] pulled the canvas cover off  
the truck and we all stood up.…I had the vague 
impression that this was to be a decisive moment. 
The canvas was like a theater curtain that had been 
prematurely drawn.  A new scene, indeed a new 
act, had begun, and none of  us were ready for it….
But I didn’t have long to inquire because the men 
and women standing around the truck werealready 
stepping forward for a closer look.  How frightfully 
filthy they all were, dressed like beggars, theirhair 
caked and matted with dirt.  Panic took hold of  me.4
Kang and his family would go on to spend ten long 
years at the Yodok concentration camp, a mass political 
penal-labor camp (“kwan-li-so”) where North Korean 
citizens who are considered enemies of  the State are ba-
nished and sentenced to a lifetime of  “slave labor in mi-
ning, logging, and farming enterprises”, without any sort 
of  judicial process involved, unless they are sent to the 
“revolutionizing zone”.5  Although North Korea is one 
of  the most isolated countries in the world,6 and is not 
willing to allow international groups or researchers to 
enter into its country for the purposes of  confirming the 
existence of  the Yodok camp,7 satellite images and for-
mer prisoner testimonials have provided the internatio-
nal community with more than enough information to 
confirm not only its existence, but also the torturous and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading techniques used therein.8 
Run by the National Security Agency9, the Yodok 
camp, located in the Hamgyong Namdo Province, is ap-
3  Id. at 45 and 46 (“most of  the time I stayed seated…grieving the 
death of  several of  my fish”).
4  Id. at 48-9.
5  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 10, 11.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
6  Robert L. Worden, “North Korea: A Country Study” xxiii.  Fed-
eral Research Division, Library of  Congress, 2008 (“Major Features: 
Traditionally socialized, centrally planned, and primarily industrial-
ized command economy isolated from rest of  world”).
7  SEE Section V of  this Paper.
8  Examples include David Hawk’s, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing 
North Korea’s Prison Camps 10, 11.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights 
in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003), and “Yodok, North Korea 
– Write for Rights 2011”, Amnesty International USA, November 
15, 2011, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/multimedia/
yodok-north-korea-write-for-rights-2011 (last visited March 15, 2012).
9  White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2005 69-70, Korean 
Institute for National Unification, Seoul, 2005.
proximately 378 kilometers in area,10 and is surrounded 
by barbed-wire fences three to four meters high, electri-
cally-wired walls, strategically placed watch towers, and 
over a thousand prison guards armed with automatic 
rifles and well-trained guard dogs.11  Because Yodok is 
a political prisoner camp, it abides by the principle of  
“guilt by association”, first articulated by Kim Il Sung in 
1972, which means that up to three generations of  an 
offender’s family automatically can go to prison, regar-
dless of  whether or not the family member committed 
a crime.12  Yodok is also the only known political camp 
to have a re-education section (“revolutionizing zone”), 
a special part of  the camp which is separate from the 
“total control zone”13 and from which a select number 
of  prisoners have been released and allowed to re-enter 
“normal” North Korean life.14  
Regardless of  what section of  the camp they are 
in, all Yodok prisoners are subject to torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading punishment, as well as a subhu-
man standard of  living.15  Yodok prisoners are forced 
to complete back-breaking labor from dawn to dusk 
every day,16 eat inadequate amounts of  a crudely made 
10  Blain Harden, “Outside World Turns Blind Eye to N. Ko-
rea’s Hard-Labor Camps”, Washington Post, July 20, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2009/07/19/AR2009071902178.html (last visited April 5, 
2012).
11  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 34.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Ko-
rea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
12  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 24.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003), 25 (“The other strikingly abnormal 
characteristic of  the kwan-li-so system is that prisoners are not ar-
rested, charged (that is, told of  their offense), or tried in any sort 
judicial procedure”).
13  Kang Chul Hwan, “A Christian Family Detained for life for 
Praying”, The Daily NK, Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://www.
dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02600&num=313 (last 
visited April 5, 2012).
14  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 12, 26.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
15  SEE Survey Report on Political Prisoners’ Camps in North Korea, 
National Human Rights Commission of  Korea, Dec. 2009, & David 
Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps. 
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, 
D.C. 2003).
16  “North Korea: images reveal scale of  political prison camps”, 
Amnesty International, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.am-
nestyusa.org/news/press-releases/north-korea-images-reveal-scale-
of-political-prison-camps (last visited March 28, 2012) (Jeong Ky-
oungil, former prisoner at Yodok: ‘”A day starts at 4am with an early 
shift, also called the ‘pre-meal shift’, until 7am. Then breakfast from 
7am to 8am but the meal is only 200g of  poorly prepared corn gruel 
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corn gruel which turns their stomachs inside out,17 and 
praise and worship the Kim family at nightly meetings, 
thanking their Dear Leader for his infinite compassion 
and love in giving them, the lowly political prisoners, 
the chance to correct their sinful and anti-revolutionary 
ways.18  All the while, the fear of  life-threatening solitary 
confinement and death by execution looms over their 
heads, threats made real by the existence of  the “swea-
tbox”, a torture device used to discipline prisoners for 
what is considered exceptionally bad behavior,19 and by 
the frequent execution of  prisoners in public, prisoners 
who did nothing more than try to escape the man-made 
Hell that is Yodok.20  
Kang’s story of  survival at Yodok21 serves as a re-
minder that hundreds of  thousands of  North Koreans 
still remain imprisoned in concentration camps22 all 
over North Korea.23  The few North Korean citizens 
for each meal. Then there is a morning shift from 8am to 12pm and 
a lunch until 1pm. Then work again from 1pm to 8pm and dinner 
from 8pm to 9pm. From 9pm to 11pm, it’s time for ideology educa-
tion. If  we don’t memorize the ten codes of  ethics we would not be 
allowed to sleep. This is the daily schedule’”).
17  “North Korea: images reveal scale of  political prison camps”, 
Amnesty International, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.am-
nestyusa.org/news/press-releases/north-korea-images-reveal-
scale-of-political-prison-camps (last visited March 28, 2012) (Jeong 
Kyoungil, former prisoner at Yodok: At night, “’200g of  poorly 
prepared corn gruel in a bowl would only be given if  we finish our 
daily tasks).
18  SEE Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums 
of  Pyongyang 47-159 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
19  Id. at 77, 93-4, 96.
20  Id. at 47-159 (at 158: “The next day, the liberated families were 
summoned to the security office of  the village, where we each had 
to sign a document promising never to reveal any information about 
Yodok or about what they had seen during their incarceration”).
21  Id. at 158.
22  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 2.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 
(Washington, D.C. 2003) (“The kwan-li-so political penal labor colo-
nies are also variously translated into English as “control centers,” 
“management centers,” “concentration camps,” or “political prison 
camps”).
23  Bryna Subherwal, “Families Imprisoned in Secret Camps”, 
Human Rights Now: The Amnesty International USA Web Log, 
November 23, 2011, available at http://blog.amnestyusa.org/iar/
families-imprisoned-in-secret-camps-in-north-korea/ (last visited 
March 15, 2012) (“Although authorities deny the existence of  politi-
cal prison camps in North Korea, Amnesty International has veri-
fied that Yodok is one of  at least six such camps in which 200,000 
political prisoners and their families are held”) (emphasis not 
added); Yodok, North Korea – Write for Rights 2011, Amnesty 
International USA, November 15, 2011, available at http://www.
amnestyusa.org/news/multimedia/yodok-north-korea-write-for-
rights-2011 (last visited March 15, 2012) (Currently, “[t]ens of  thou-
sands of  people are held in Yodok political prison camp, with an 
who have been released from Yodok and managed to 
escape the country have attested to the camp’s horrible 
conditions, and the inhumane treatment of  prisoners 
therein.  Their stories, which are outlined in greater de-
tail later in this paper, provide a vivid account of  daily 
life in Yodok, and all the evidence one needs to con-
clude that the Yodok prison is nothing short of  a 21st 
century concentration camp.
The very existence of  the Yodok camp, and its phi-
losophy of  political reformation through torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, runs con-
trary to the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of  Prisoners, a non-binding set of  guidelines for both in-
ternational and domestic law regarding how individuals 
held in prisons and in other forms of  custody are to be 
treated, with the ideals espoused in major human rights 
instruments - particularly a person’s right to human dig-
nity - permeating throughout the Rules.24 
In the pages that follow, Yodok’s most egregious 
violations of  the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of  Prisoners will be analyzed.  In particu-
lar, the focus will be on the prison’s punishment and 
discipline of  prisoners, since this is arguably the State’s 
greatest weapon in keeping its prisoners in line and “re-
forming” them into law-abiding revolutionaries.25  The 
estimate of  around 50,000, and most are imprisoned there without 
trial or following grossly unfair trials on the basis of  “confessions” 
obtained through torture”); David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Ex-
posing North Korea’s Prison Camps 34, U.S. Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea, Washington D.C. 2003 (“During An Hyuk’s 
year-and-a-half  imprisonment [1987-89], there were some 30,000 
prisoners in the lifetime area, and 1,300 singles and 9,300 family 
members in the revolutionizing zone along with some 5,900 Kore-
ans, including Kang’s family”); “Liberty in North Korea: The North 
Korean Human Rights Crisis”, Adrian E. Hong, June 29, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zHvf8OLYND4 (last 
visited March 28, 2012) (approx. 15:27: over 250,000 people are in 
North Korean concentration camps). 
24  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Pris-
oners, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
25  Indeed, Kim Il Sung and the Korean Worker’s Party were well 
aware of  the effectiveness of  such a policy.  Establishing the “Dem-
ocratic People’s Republic of  Korea” (heretofore “North Korea”) on 
September 9th, 1948, the Korean Workers’ Party – led by premier 
Kim Il Sung – consolidated power in part by creating a system of  
political prison and labor camps.  Any citizen whose loyalty to both 
the Party and to the Revolution was deemed questionable was sent 
to one of  these camps, depending on the nature and severity of  the 
crime.  SEE Andrea Matles Savada, North Korea: A Country Study 
38, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1994, & 
David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison 
Camps 37-8.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 
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policy of  sending citizens to concentration camps for 
both minor and major political infractions,26 part of  
the country’s “national democratic revolution”, dates at 
least as far back as the death of  Joseph Stalin in 195327 
and Kim Il Sung’s establishment of  a “hermit kingdom” 
style of  isolation and self-reliance, which meant that ci-
tizens who tried to leave the country and were caught 
were sent to political penal labor camps.28 
This inhumane policy of  sending citizens to camps 
has been a long tradition faithfully adhered to by Kim Il 
Sung, Kim Jong Il, and the newest leader to date, Kim 
Jong-un, who was appointed supreme commander of  
North Korea on December 30th, 2011.29 Even before 
Kim Jong-un’s accession as the new leader, his father, 
Kim Jong Il, upon Kim Jong-un being appointed a four-
-star general in 2010, substantially increased the number 
of  citizens being sent to political prison camps, leading 
one to believe that such camps, and the torture tactics 
(Washington, D.C. 2003) (“Kim Il-sung, under Soviet tutelage, in-
stituted what is usually termed a ‘national democratic revolution’…
[which] included a purge of  Koreans in the colonial bureaucracy, 
who thought that Korea should follow the Japanese path to eco-
nomic, social and political modernization, and Korean police offic-
ers who had collaborated with the harshly repressive Japanese rule 
in Korea. Many purged police officials and dispossessed Korean 
landlords fled to the south. Many of  their family members who re-
mained in the north ended up in labor camps); The gulag behind 
the goose-steps, April 21st, 2012, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/21553090  (last visited May 17th, 2013) (“The new edi-
tion [of  “The Hidden Gulag”] provides testimony starting in 1970 
about different types of  forced-labour camps: the kwan-li-so for po-
litical prisoners, from which there is usually no release; the kyo-hwa-so 
penitentiaries mostly for those serving out sentences as common 
criminals; and detention centres for those forcibly repatriated from 
China) (emphasis added).
26  The reasons why citizens are sent to these camps range from 
allegations of  high treason to accidently dirtying a portrait of  Kim 
Il Sung.  Regardless, citizens are not usually told what particular law 
they have broken or given any sort of  judicial process.  For some 
examples, SEE Hidden Gulag 2 and The Aquariums of  Pyongyang.
27  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: The Lives 
and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 37-9.  U.S. 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 
2012). (“Following the death of  Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union 
and most of  Eastern Europe curbed some of  the worst excesses 
of  Stalinism seeking a measure of  return to ‘socialist legality,’ and in 
anticipation of  what became known as ‘revisionism,’ the possibility 
of  “peaceful co-existence” between capitalism and socialism. Ruling 
communist parties in East Asia took a dramatically different course 
that has been described as ‘national Stalinism’”).
28  Id. at 39-40.
29  “Kim Jong-un appointed supreme commander of  North Ko-
rea’s military”, The Telegraph, Dec. 30, 2012, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8985807/
Kim-Jong-un-appointed-supreme-commander-of-North-Koreas-
military.html (last visited May 7th, 2013).
used therein, are useful in suppressing any trace of  anti-
-revolutionary thought or sentiment, and that sending 
more citizens to these camps is especially effective in 
ensuring a smooth transition of  power.30  This philoso-
phy is reflected in North Korea’s 1950 Penal Code, whi-
ch states that the purposes underlying such punishment 
are “to suppress class enemies, educate the population 
in the spirit of  ‘socialist patriotism,’ and reeducate and 
punish individuals for crimes stemming from ‘capitalist’ 
thinking.31
The flow of  this paper will be as follows:  First, I will 
briefly provide the international definitions of  “torture” 
and “cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment”, as well 
as some notable examples of  torture and relevant inter-
national human rights case law.  Then, I will be looking at 
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Priso-
ners, since they provide specific guidelines regarding the 
treatment of  prisoners and because they are considered 
the international authority on the proper treatment of  
prisoners (one of  the major treaties which helps regulate 
how a nation-state treats its prisoners – the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) - will only be discussed here when 
analyzing what constitutes torture and when discussing 
the notes and comments to the U.N. Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners, since North Korea has 
yet to sign or ratify CAT)32.  After this legal analysis, I 
will talk about how North Korea is violating the U.N. 
Standard Minimum Rules with their continued operation 
30  SEE “North Korea: Kim Jong-il’s death could be opportunity 
for human rights”, Amnesty International, Dec. 19, 2011, available 
at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/north-korea-kim-jong-il-s-
death-opportunity-improving-human-rights-2011-12-19 (last visited 
March 28, 2012) (“recent reports received by Amnesty International 
suggest that the North Korean government has purged possibly 
hundreds of  officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jong-un’s suc-
cession, by having them executed or sent to political prison camps. 
’Our information over the last year indicates that Kim Jong-un and 
his supporters will try to consolidate his new rule by intensifying 
repression and crushing any possibility of  dissent,’ said Sam Zarifi”).
31  Andrea Matles Savada, North Korea: A Country Study 273-
4, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1994 (“the 
code’s ambiguity, the clear official preference for rehabilitating indi-
viduals through a combination of  punishment and reeducation, and 
additional severity for crimes against the state or family reflect the 
lack of  distinction among politics, morality, and law in neo-Confu-
cian thought”).
32  To see the ratification status of  the Convention Against Tor-
ture, SEE “Chapter IV: Human Rights – 9. Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment”, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2
&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited 
March 21, 2012).
PA
PA
IN
, T
om
 T
he
od
or
e .
 T
he
 U
.N
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
M
in
im
um
 R
ul
es
 fo
r t
he
 T
re
at
m
en
t o
f 
Pr
iso
ne
rs
 an
d 
N
or
th
 K
or
ea
: H
ow
 N
or
th
 K
or
ea
 is
 V
io
lat
in
g 
th
es
e R
ul
es
 w
ith
 it
s O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e Y
od
ok
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
Ca
m
p.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
10
, n
. 2
, 2
01
3 
p.
 1
01
-1
24
106
of  Yodok, relying on both the testimonials of  prisoners 
and the reports of  non-governmental organizations to 
outline each specific violation.  Once each human rights 
violation has been accounted for, I will then discuss what 
The Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 
the U.N. General Assembly, and the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur of  Human Rights have done, if  anything, to try 
and get North Korea to either change the conditions of  
confinement for its prisoners in Yodok, or shut down 
Yodok entirely, as well as the State’s response to this in-
ternational pressure.  In the end, I will discuss what the 
International Community can do to put pressure on 
North Korea to close Yodok, since the current existence 
and persistence of  Yodok as a full-fledged concentration 
camp housing thousands of  innocent citizens is a human 
rights situation which should concern everyone.
2. torture And cruel, inhumAn, And degrA-
ding punishment, deFined
2.1 Torture
Arguably the most widely accepted international defini-
tion of  torture33 is set forth in Article 1 of  the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).34  According to CAT, torture is:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
33  There is no one, single definition of  torture, although a myriad 
of  definitions exist.  This leads governments to call its acts of  tor-
ture by other names, as pointed out by the 1973 Amnesty Interna-
tional Report on Torture.  The acts we will be discussing, however, 
are clearly torture on their face, and so the purpose of  providing the 
definition stated above is to guide the reader and get her thinking 
about the acts of  torture committed in Yodok in relation to spe-
cific elements of  an acceptable definition.  For more on the defini-
tion of  torture, SEE Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, Floersheimer 
Center for Constitutional Democracy, Cardozo Law School, Dec. 
2005, available at http://ranid.mc.yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLO-
ERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pdf  (last visited April 7, 2012).
34  “Defining torture”, International Rehabilitation Council for 
Torture Victims, available at http://www.irct.org/what-is-torture/
defining-torture.aspx (last visited April 7, 2012); Gail H. Miller, De-
fining Torture, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, 
Cardozo Law School, Dec. 2005, available at http://ranid.mc.yu.edu/
cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pdf  
(last visited April 7, 2012); Bo Kyi & Hannah Scott, Torture, Po-
litical Prisoners and the UN-Rule of  Law: Challenges to Peace, Se-
curity and Human Rights in Burma, available at http://www.aappb.
org/Torture_political_prisoners_and_the_un-rule_of_law.pdf  (last 
visited April 7, 2012).
inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of  
having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of  any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of  
or with the consent or acquiescence of  a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
It does not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions.35 
(emphasis added)
Following this definition is Article 2’s absolute pro-
hibition on all forms of  torture, which according to Ge-
neral Comment No. 2 has the force of  customary inter-
national law (specifically a jus cogens norm36), making 
it non-derogable under all circumstances.37  Indeed, the 
forced internment and torturing of  hundreds of  thou-
sands of  North Korean citizens at Yodok is in clear 
violation of  the universal principle, espoused by the 
Human Rights Committee, the American Convention 
for Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the European Court of  Human Rights, 
and the former Commission on Human Rights, that the 
right to humane treatment is a right of  universal signi-
ficance.38
35  UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 
1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html [accessed 
7 April 2012].
36  Pursuant to Article 53 of  the Vienna Convention, a jus cogens 
norm is defined as “a norm accepted and recognized by the inter-
national community of  States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a sub-
sequent norm of  general international law having the same charac-
ter”.  Therefore, every State in the world has several non-derogable 
obligations stemming from the existence of  this jus cogen norm, 
including the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of  
a statute of  limitations, the non-derogation of  this norm in times of  
peace, war, or “states of  emergency”, and so on.  Additionally, the 
Articles of  the International Law Commission explicitly recognizes 
the prohibition against torture and the prohibition of  cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment as a jus cogen norm.  For more, SEE 
Mirgen Prence, Torture as Jus Cogen Norm, Acta U. Danubius Jur. 87 
(2011).   ALSO SEE Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14 (affirming jus 
cogens as an accepted doctrine of  international law).
37  UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 
1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html [accessed 
7 April 2012].
38  From North Korea Now - International Law:  “Human rights 
violated in forced internment are either ‘peremptory norms’ (jus co-
gens, or a fundamental principle of  international law) themselves, or 
affect the protection of  such peremptory norms, including the right 
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In addition to CAT’s definition of  torture, the In-
ternational Covenant of  Civil and Political Rights (IC-
CPR), to which North Korea is a party to, provides a 
succinct but equally powerful definition of  torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. 39  Article 7 
to the ICCPR reads as follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.40
General Comment No. 20 to the ICCPR, which 
deals directly with the Covenant’s prohibition of  tor-
ture and cruel treatment or punishment, expands upon 
the ICCPR’s concise definition by outlining the duties 
which all the State parties have and which they must 
fulfill to the best of  their abilities in order to adequate-
ly comply with Article 7, including the duty to “afford 
everyone protection through legislative and other mea-
sures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited 
by Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their 
official or private capacity.”41  In addition, the General 
to life and the right to be free from torture.  Article 4 of  the ICCPR 
allows for the derogation from certain human rights obligations dur-
ing times of  emergency.  However, not only is Article 4 inapplicable 
to the case of  North Korea because no such emergency exists, but 
the Human Rights Committee, Article 27(2) of  the American Con-
vention for Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, the European Court of  Human Rights, and the former 
Commission on Human Rights, have affirmed that judicial guaran-
tees, because they protect non-derogable rights to life and freedom 
from torture, cannot be derogated from in times of  emergency. 
This consensus across international human rights bodies affirms the 
universal significance of  the right to liberty and security, the right to 
a fair trial, and the right to humane treatment”.
39  To see the ratification status of  the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, SEE “Chapter IV: Human Rights – 4. In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, United Nations 
Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewD-
etails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited March 21, 2012) (The “Democratic People’s Republic of  
Korea”, or North Korea, acceded to the ICCPR on September 14th, 
1981, but subsequently sent the Secretary-General a notification of  
withdrawal on August 23rd, 1997, although, as the Secretary General 
himself  noted, such a withdrawal is not possible unless all the State 
Parties to the ICCPR consent to the withdrawal.  The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur still considers North Korea a party to the ICCPR, since 
it was no legally possible for North Korea to unilaterally withdraw 
from the ICCPR). 
40  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A [XX1] Article 7. 16 December 
1966.
41  UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 20, 
Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of  torture and cruel treat-
ment or punishment, 10 March 1992, CCPR/C/GC/20, available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/6924291970754969
c12563ed004c8ae5?Opendocument [accessed 28 January 2013].
Comment points out that Article 7 is reinforced and 
“complemented by the positive requirements of  article 
10, paragraph 1, of  the Covenant, which stipulates that 
‘All persons deprived of  their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity 
of  the human person.’”42  The General Comment also 
states that Article 7 can never be derogated, even in ti-
mes of  public emergency (Statement 3), that Article 7’s 
absolute prohibition applies to acts which cause mental 
suffering and which can be considered corporal punish-
ment (Statement 5), and that solitary confinement is 
absolutely prohibited under Article 7 (Statement 6). 43 
Perhaps the most powerful clause can be found in Sta-
tement 13 of  General Comment 20, which states that 
“[t]hose who violate article 7, whether by encouraging, 
ordering, tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts, 
must be held responsible”.44  It is no wonder, then, that 
five years after the publication of  this Comment to the 
ICCPR, which bolstered Article 7’s already direct and 
unwavering prohibition of  torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment, North Korea considered it in 
their best interest to try and withdraw from the treaty.45
42  Id.  
43  Id.
44  Id.
45  SEE FN 38, supra; in addition, the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture provides a more general defini-
tion of  torture, e.g. “the use of  methods upon a person intended 
to obliterate the personality of  the victim or to diminish his physi-
cal or mental capacities, even if  they do not cause physical pain or 
mental anguish”.  Organization of  American States, Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Article 2, 9 December 
1985, OAS Treaty Series, No. 67, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3620.html [accessed 28 January 2013] 
(“For the purposes of  this Convention, torture shall be understood 
to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental 
pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of  criminal 
investigation, as a means of  intimidation, as personal punishment, as 
a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture 
shall also be understood to be the use of  methods upon a person 
intended to obliterate the personality of  the victim or to diminish 
his physical or mental capacities, even if  they do not cause physical 
pain or mental anguish.  The concept of  torture shall not include 
physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the 
consequence of  lawful measures, provided that they do not include 
the performance of  the acts or use of  the methods referred to in 
this article”).  The European Convention on Human Rights, mean-
while, provides an even more succinct definition of  torture than the 
ICCPR: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment.”  Council of  Europe, European 
Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 
1950, ETS 5, Art. 3, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b3b04.html [accessed 5 February 2013].
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While General Comment 20 to the ICCPR sidesteps the 
opportunity to list instances of  prohibited acts which cons-
titute torture,46 examples of  acts which fall under the afore-
mentioned definitions of  torture (as provided by CAT and 
the ICCPR) are numerous. The International Rehabilitation 
Council for Torture Victims, the largest membership-based 
organization which helps rehabilitate torture victims and pre-
vent the torture of  others,47 lists beatings, electrical shocks, 
suffocation, burns, stretching, and sensory deprivation as 
examples of  acts constituting torture, pursuant to the defini-
tion set forth in CAT.48  Along the same lines, Amnesty Inter-
national, in reporting on the inhumane conditions of  Yodok, 
states that the combination of  forced labor in dangerous 
conditions with inadequate food, beatings, unhygienic living 
conditions, and virtually no medical care constitutes a sys-
tematic policy of  torture officially condoned in the camp.49 
Amnesty also refers to North Korea’s use of  a “torture cell” 
(or “punishment cell”, as it will be referred to as later), a cell 
so small that a prisoner can neither stand nor lie down in it, 
along with its use of  solitary confinement and other tortu-
re techniques generally.50  Human Rights Watch, in its 2012 
World Report on North Korea, cited “sleep deprivation, bea-
tings with iron rods or sticks, kicking and slapping, and en-
forced sitting or standing for hours” as examples of  torture 
techniques deployed in North Korean prison camps.51.” 
46  General Comment No. 20, statement 4: “The Covenant does not 
contain any definition of  the concepts covered by article 7, nor does the 
Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of  prohibited acts or to 
establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of  punishment 
or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity 
of  the treatment applied.”  UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Gen-
eral comment no. 20, Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of  torture 
and cruel treatment or punishment, 10 March 1992, CCPR/C/GC/20, avail-
able at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/69242919707549
69c12563ed004c8ae5?Opendocument [accessed 28 January 2013].
47  “What is the IRCT”, International Rehabilitation Council for 
Torture Victims, available at http://www.irct.org/about-us/what-is-
the-irct.aspx (last visited April 7, 2012) (“Our members comprise 
more than 140 independent organisations in over 70 countries…
[W]e are the largest membership-based civil society organisation to 
work in the field of  torture rehabilitation and prevention”).
48  “What is torture?”, International Rehabilitation Council for 
Torture Victims, available at http://www.irct.org/what-is-torture/
defining-torture.aspx (last visited April 7, 2012).
49  “Yodok, North Korea – Write for Rights 2011”, Amnesty In-
ternational, Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
news/multimedia/yodok-north-korea-write-for-rights-2011 (last 
visited April 7, 2012).
50  “North Korea: Images reveal scale of  political prison camps”, 
Amnesty International, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.am-
nestyusa.org/news/press-releases/north-korea-images-reveal-scale-
of-political-prison-camps (last visited April 7, 2012).
51  “World Report 2012: North Korea”, Human Rights Watch, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-
There is also human rights case law which sheds 
some light on what constitutes torture in the internatio-
nal human rights community.  In Ireland v. U.K., 5310/71 
(European Court of  Human Rights 1977), the Court 
stated that “torture…is undoubtedly an aggravated 
form of  inhuman treatment causing intense physical 
and/or mental suffering.”52  The Court then went on to 
emphasize that torture should be considered from both 
an objective and subjective perspective, which means 
that such factors as the method of  torture employed, 
the duration of  such treatment, the age, sex and health 
of  the person exposed to it, the likelihood that such 
treatment might injure the person exposed, and whe-
ther the torture could cause serious long term injuries, 
all need to be taken into account.53
2.2 Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishment
Neither CAT nor the ICCPR provide a definition of  
what constitutes cruel, inhuman, and degrading punish-
ment (“CID”).  However, the Elements of  Crimes for the 
International Criminal Court provide a useful definition, 
stating in sum that CID is the same as torture, except that 
there is no requirement that the punishment be inflicted for 
a specific purpose.54  In other words, CID can be seen as 
acts which would be considered torture, but for the lack of  
a specific motive or intent (i.e. to extract a confession).  This 
distinction is inherent in the definition of  torture under 
CAT, which lists motive or intent as an essential element.55
As mentioned above, ICCPR Article 7 provides in 
pertinent part that “[n]o one shall be subjected to…cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”56  In 
addition, General Comment 20 expands upon Article 7’s 
2012-north-korea (last visited April 7, 2012).
52  Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 5310/71, Council of  Europe: Eu-
ropean Court of  Human Rights, 13 December 1977, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7004.html [accessed 
28 January 2013]
53  Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 5310/71, Council of  Europe: Eu-
ropean Court of  Human Rights, 13 December 1977, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7004.html [accessed 
28 January 2013].
54  Elements of  Crimes for the ICC, Definition of  inhuman treat-
ment as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(ii)).
55  UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 
1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html [accessed 
7 April 2012].
56  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 2200A [XX1] Article 7. 16 December 1966.
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prohibition by outlining the duties of  the State Parties 
and certain acts which fall under the purview of  Article 
7, although distinctions between torture and cruel, inhu-
man and degrading punishment are not delineated.57
While the aforementioned treaties may be silent as to 
what constitutes CID, the European Court of  Human Ri-
ghts, in the Ireland v. U.K. case mentioned above,58 talked 
about the five specific techniques which they determined 
constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, in vio-
lation of  the European Convention on Human Rights: (i) 
wall-standing for hours at a time, (ii) hooding for extended 
periods of  time, (iii) subjection to a loud hissing noise, (iv) 
sleep deprivation, and (v) deprivation of  food and drink.59
3. u.n. stAndArd minimum rules For the 
treAtment oF prisoners60
The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
57  UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 20, 
Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of  torture and cruel treat-
ment or punishment, 10 March 1992, CCPR/C/GC/20, available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/6924291970754969
c12563ed004c8ae5?Opendocument [accessed 28 January 2013].
58  SEE the section on torture in this article, supra.
59  Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 5310/71, Council of  Europe: Euro-
pean Court of  Human Rights, 13 December 1977, available at: http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7004.html [accessed 28 January 
2013] (“(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods 
of  some hours in a “stress position”, described by those who under-
went it as being “spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put 
high above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet 
back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of  the body 
mainly on the fingers”; (b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured 
bag over the detainees’ heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all 
the time except during interrogation; (c) subjection to noise: pending 
their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where there was 
a continuous loud and hissing noise; (d) deprivation of  sleep: pending 
their interrogations, depriving the detainees of  sleep; (e) deprivation of  
food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their 
stay at the centre and pending interrogations”).
60  Several binding and non-binding international instruments 
have been adopted in regards to the detention and treatment of  pris-
oners.  Some of  these binding instruments include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention Against Torture, 
and the Geneva Conventions of  1949.  Some of  the non-binding 
instruments include the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, the 
U.N. General Assembly’s Declaration on the Protection of  All Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture, Basic Principles for the Treatment of  Prisoners, 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of  Juveniles Deprived of  their Liberty, 
Declaration on the Protection of  All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Principles 
on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of  Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Declaration of  Basic 
Principles of  Justice for Victims of  Crime and Abuse of  Power.
Prisoners (“U.N. Standard Minimum Rules”) were adop-
ted by the First United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Control in 1955, and were subsequently 
approved by the Economic and Social Council of  the 
United Nations in 1957.61  The product of  thirty years 
of  deliberation and numerous revisions and updates 
(beginning in 1926 with the work of  the International 
Penitentiary Commission),62 the U.N. Standard Mini-
mum Rules represent the International Community’s 
general consensus as to what constitutes the humane 
and proper treatment of  prisoners, and have the full 
support of  the U.N., which considers the rules “a body 
of  doctrine representing ‘as a whole, the minimum con-
ditions which are accepted as suitable.’”63  Some of  the 
principles set forth in the U.N. Standard Minimum Ru-
les include rights pertaining to accommodation (Rules 
9-14), personal hygiene (15-16), clothing and bedding 
(17-19), food (20), exercise and sport (21), and medical 
services (22-26), as well as rules pertaining to the disci-
pline and punishment of  prisoners (27-32) and the use 
of  instruments of  restraint (33-34).
The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules are indicative of  
the U.N.’s all–important role in setting minimum, ba-
seline human rights standards, with the aim of  better 
protecting people’s human rights and raising the basic 
standard of  living for all.64  Indeed, these rules have 
61  Office of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: International Law, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/eng-
lish/ (last visited March 21, 2012); ALSO SEE “Analysis of  Extent 
of  Applicability of  the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of  Prisoners to Community-Based Supervision and Residen-
tial Care for Convicted Offenders” 1, Commission on Correctional 
Facilities and Services, Washington D.C., 1974 (These standard min-
imum rules were also endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in the 
form of  future resolutions, which recommended the implementa-
tion and adoption of  these rules by all member States).
62  Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Pris-
oners 1, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2012.
63  “Revision of  the UN Standard Minimum Rules?” 1-2, Associa-
tion for the Prevention of  Torture (APT), Dec. 14 2011, available at 
http://apt.ch/region/unlegal/APT_Position_SMR.pdf  (last visited 
March 21, 2012); Analysis of  Extent of  Applicability of  Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners to Community-
Based Supervision and Residential Care for Convicted Offenders.
64  William Clifford, The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of  Prisoners 233, The American Journal of  International Law, 
Vol. 66, No. 4 (September 1972); Imprisonment Today and Tomor-
row 705 (“These Rules have always been considered as the most im-
portant international document in the area of  prisons.  They are the 
manifestation of  the moral and philosophical standards that have 
consistently inspired progress and reform in prison conditions since 
the whole concept of  imprisonment became the subject of  regular 
international debate and co-operation in the last quarter of  the nine-
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contributed positively to the establishment and modifi-
cation of  national policies and practices,65 helped in part 
by Economic and Social Council Resolution 1984/47, 
which puts forth the procedures by which the U.N. 
Standard Minimum Rules can be implemented into 
domestic practices and institutions.66  For example, the 
Secretary-General invited Member States to send perio-
dic reports to the U.N. regarding the implementation 
and incorporation of  these rules into their domestic 
law.67  Experts applaud the high standing and legitimacy 
of  these rules in the international community today,68 
and their success in guiding countries towards impro-
ving their prison system is readily apparent.69  As the 
late Dr. Kurt Neudek, who served on five U.N. world 
congresses on the prevention of  crime and treatment 
of  prisoners,70 once wrote:
[T]he Rules have been widely recognized as 
constituting a virtual code of  practice in prison 
administration[;] they reach out with the authority 
of  the United Nations, to provide an important 
platform for world-wide prison reform…the 
Rules may have reached the status of  customary 
international law71
teenth century”) (emphasis not added).
65  United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custo-
dial Measures (The Tokyo Rules)., U.N. General Assembly, A/
RES/45/110, Dec. 14, 1990. 
66  Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners 2, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 
2012.
67  The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prison-
ers in the Light of  Recent Developments in the Correctional Field 
13, A/CONF.43/3, United Nations 1970; Open-Ended Intergov-
ernmental Expert Group Meeting on the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 2.
68  Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners 6, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 
2012 (“the Rules continued to be held in high regard and…were 
the main reference point in terms of  measuring minimum standards 
within the prison environment”).
69  Id. at 4-5(“A large number of  reporting countries, including. 
Austria, China, Finland, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom, indicated that their national 
legislation on the treatment of  prisoners was based, or had been 
greatly influenced by the Rules”).
70  “Obituary – IAP Honorary Member, Kurt Neudek, 15 April 
1935 – 3 August 2005, available at http://www.zoominfo.com/
CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=1934449955&page_url=//
www.iap.nl.com/newsletters/32.html&page_last_updated=2007-
11-23T02:53:36&firstName=Kurt&lastName=Neudek (last visited 
May 14, 2012).
71  Kenneth G. Zysk & Dirk Van Zyl Smit, Imprisonment Today 
and Tomorrow: International Perspectives on Prisoners’ Rights and 
Prison Conditions 706 (Brill Academic Publishers, 2001)  (the quote 
was taken from a paper which Dr. Kurt Neudek wrote describing 
Additionally, the European Court of  Human Ri-
ghts and even some U.S. courts have cited the U.N. 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Priso-
ners in their opinions, particularly in the legal analysis 
portions of  their decisions.72   The Rules also guide 
the treatment of  prisoners in the Detention Center in 
The Hague.73 
For the purposes of  this paper, I will be focusing 
on the following articles, as they pertain specifically to 
the disciplining and punishing of  prisoners:
Article 27: Discipline and order shall be maintained 
with firmness, but with no more restriction than 
is necessary for safe custody  and well-ordered 
community life. 
Article 28(1): No prisoner shall be employed, in the 
service of  the institution, in any disciplinary capacity. 
(2) This rule shall not, however, impede the proper 
functioning of  systems based on self-government, 
under which specified social, educational or sports 
activities or responsibilities are entrusted, under 
supervision, to prisoners who are formed into 
groups for the purposes of  treatment.
Article 31: Corporal punishment, punishment by 
placing in a dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishments shall be completely 
prohibited as punishments for disciplinary offences.
Article 32(1): Punishment by close confinement or 
reduction of  diet shall never be inflicted unless the 
medical officer has examined the prisoner and 
certified in writing that he is fit to sustain it.74 
(emphasis added)
the process of  preparing for the Eighth U.N. Congress on Crime 
Prevention and the Treatment of  Offenders (Havana, Cuba, 1990).
72  SEE Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey 19 (European Ct. of  
Human Rights 2005) (“Conditions under which detainees are held 
pre-trial are reportedly so poor as to amount to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.  In 1997 the Uzbek authorities admitted that 
conditions of  detention fell far short of  the UN basic minimum 
standards for the treatment of  prisoners”); Ananyev and Others v. Rus-
sia 12-3 (European Ct. of  Human Rights 2012); Kane v. Winn, 319 
F.Supp.2d 162 (D. Mass. 2004) (talking about the Rules in relation to 
customary international law).
73  ICC – What are the conditions of  detention at the Deten-
tion Centre in the Hague?  International Criminal Court, available 
at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/about%20the%20court/
frequently%20asked%20questions/24 (last visited January 31, 2013) 
(“The ICC Detention Centre operates in conformity with the high-
est international human rights standards for the treatment of  detain-
ees, such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules”).
74  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Pris-
oners, 30 August 1955, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b36e8.html (last accessed 21 March 2012).
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3.1 Notes and Comments to the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules
On December 21, 2010, pursuant to Resolution 
65/230, the U.N. General Assembly requested that the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justi-
ce establish an open-ended intergovernmental expert 
group (held in Vienna from January 31st to February 2nd, 
2012)75 “to exchange information on best practices, as 
well as national legislation and existing international law, 
and on the revision of  the existing United Nations stan-
dard minimum rules for the treatment of  prisoners”, 
76 in order to better reflect advances in the treatment 
of  prisoners. 77 The General-Secretariat prepared notes 
and comments for each rule, identifying advancements 
in relation to each rule by referencing relevant interna-
tional instruments and any contemporary views on the 
Rules.78  
Several options have been discussed regarding the 
possible revising and updating of  the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules, including the creation of  a Conven-
tion on the Treatment of  Prisoners, a complete restruc-
turing of  the Rules, a limited and targeted revision of  
the Rules, or the mere addition of  a preamble.79  With 
regard to the option of  restructuring the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules entirely, Rule 31 (prohibiting corporal 
punishment) is noted as a rule which Member States 
may consider reviewing, although rules 27, 28(1), and 
32(1)) were not considered to be in danger of  major 
75  “Open-ended intergovernmental expert group meeting on 
the United Nations standard minimum rules for the treatment of  
prisoners, 31 January – 2 February 2012, Vienna, Austria”, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, available at http://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/justice-and-prison-reform/expert-group-
meetings4.html (last accessed 22 March 2012).
76  Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners 1.  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2012.
77  Id.  Note that comments to the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules 
were also made in 1974, in preparation for the second meeting of  
the United Nations Working Group of  Experts on the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners.  For our purposes, 
however, we will focus on the notes and comments made in anticipa-
tion of  the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting, 
held from January 31 to February 2 of  2012.  Also note that, prior 
to the meeting, “the Secretariat requested Member States to provide 
information on best practices, as well as national legislation and ex-
isting international law, and on the revision of  the existing United 
Nations standard minimum rules for the treatment of  prisoners.”
78  Id.
79  Id. at 6-7.
revision, were a restructuring of  the Rules to occur 
(in general, the restructuring option seems unlikely to 
happen).80  In regards to the minimal re-drafting option, 
special attention would likely be given to rules 31 and 
32, especially the use of  close / solitary confinement 
and the reduction of  diet as a punishment, although the 
only option seems to be an expansion – rather than a 
redaction - of  this rule.81
In order to better guide the intergovernmental mee-
ting, the General- Secretariat prepared a comprehensive 
report detailing the advances made within the subject 
area of  each rule, including the treaties and other inter-
national instruments which draw upon the substance of  
the specific rule.82  Some of  these international instru-
ments include the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR), 
and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), amongst 
others.  These instruments provide a historical context 
under which the rules were first enacted, help define 
the terms found in the rules themselves, and place the 
rules into a more contemporary context.83  Each rule is 
analyzed with these three purposes in mind, including 
rules 27, 28, 31, and 32.
Rule 27, which concerns the disciplining and pu-
nishing of  prisoners, is placed in relation to Article 10 
of  the ICCPR, which states in part that “[a]ll persons 
deprived of  their liberty shall be treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of  the human 
person.”84  Rule 27 is also compared to and supple-
mented by the Rules for Juveniles Deprived of  their Liberty,85 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 7-8.
82  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions.
83  Id.
84  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
85  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions 18 (Rule 66 of  Rules for Juveniles Deprived of  their Liberty states 
that “[a]ny disciplinary measures and procedures should maintain 
the interest of  safety and an ordered community life and should be 
consistent with the upholding of  the inherent dignity of  the juvenile 
and the fundamental objective of  institutional care, namely, instill-
ing a sense of  justice, self-respect and respect for the basic rights of  
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Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of  Persons De-
prived of  Liberty in the Americas,86 World Medical Association 
Statement on Body Searches of  Prisoners,87 and the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment 16 on Article 17 
of  the ICCPR.88  The writers also provide clarification 
for the term “firmness”, a term which, they emphasize, 
“should never be understood to imply the use of  unne-
cessary force”.89
Rule 28(1), which states that “[n]o prisoner shall be 
employed, in the service of  the institution, in any dis-
ciplinary capacity”, reflects the concern that appointing 
prisoners for such purposes will undermine the general, 
overriding principle of  creating a healthy and positive 
prison environment, devoid of  fear and distrust.90  Ac-
cording to the “Analysis of  Extent of  Applicability of  
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of  Prisoners to Community-Based Supervision and 
Residential Care for Convicted Offenders”, published 
in 1974 in preparation for the second meeting of  the 
U.N.’s Working Group of  Experts on the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules, Rule 28 was designed to “bar any dis-
ciplinary or authoritarian role of  prisoners over other 
prisoners.”91  “Promoting” certain prisoners to super-
vise and report on others violates this very interpreta-
tion of  Rule 28(1), and brings with it the risk that these 
appointed prisoners will abuse their delegated powers, 
harshly disciplining their new subjects in an attempt to 
gain favor with the higher-ups.92 
Rule 31, which prohibits corporal punishment and 
all cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishments, garners 
significant support from various international legal 
instruments.93  By definition, corporal punishment is a 
every person”).
86  Id. (Principle XXI of  Principles and Best Practices on the Protection 
of  Persons Deprived of  Liberty in the Americas deals with the legality and 
necessity of  bodily searches, inspections, and the like).
87  Id. at 19 (This instrument also deals with bodily searches).
88  Id. at 18.
89  Id. at 17-8.
90  Id. at 20 (ALSO SEE European Prison Rule 62).
91  Analysis of  Extent of  Applicability of  the U.N. Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners to Community-Based 
Supervision and Residential Care for Convicted Offenders 12, 
American Bar Assoc., Washington, D.C. 1974.
92  Chico Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged abuses at 
North Korea’s prison camps”, The Washington Post, May 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-
camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited May 14, 
2012).
93  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
form of  physical punishment inflicted upon the body, 
as contrasted with a fine or pecuniary punishment.94  Its 
definition, in the context of  the treatment of  prisoners, 
“includes excessive chastisement ordered as punish-
ment for a crime or as an educative or disciplinary mea-
sure”, as articulated in General Comment No. 20 of  the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee (in reference to Article 
7 of  the ICCPR).95  The other forms of  punishment 
specified in Rule 31 – “punishment by placement in a 
dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ments” – are totally prohibited, regardless of  whether 
or not they are used as a means of  punishment for dis-
ciplinary offenses.96
Finally, the notes and comments elaborate on Rule 
32(1), which states that “[p]unishment by close confi-
nement or reduction of  diet shall never be inflicted un-
less the medical officer has examined the prisoner and 
certified in writing that he is fit to sustain it”.97  Out of  
the four rules discussed in this paper, Rule 32(1) has the 
most support in International Law, in terms of  treaties 
and other international instruments which seek to pro-
hibit close confinement as a means of  punishment in 
equally forceful and absolutist terms.  First, the authors 
define close confinement (or “solitary confinement”) as 
the act of  “confining a prisoner in a closed cell on his 
or her own”, usually involving “extensive sensory de-
privation” and “deprivation of  any human contact or 
stimulation.”98  This definition is important because it 
expands upon Rule 31 by including the deprivation of  
human contact and stimulation, which can be equally da-
maging on a person’s psyche.99  The authors then go on 
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions 22 (the following are the international legal instruments which 
are directly on point with Rule 31: International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Art. 7), expanded upon by General Comment 
No. 20 of  the UN Human Rights Committee, Rules for the Treat-
ment of  Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women 
Offenders (23), and the Convention Against Torture.
94  Free Dictionary: “corporal punishment”, available at http://
legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/corporal+punishment (last 
visited May 14, 2012).
95  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions 22.
96  Id.
97  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners 22, 30 August 1955, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref-
world/docid/3ae6b36e8.html (last accessed 21 March 2012).
98  Id. at 22.
99  SEE Brandon Keim, “Solitary Confinement: The Invisible 
Torture”, Wired, April 29, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2009/04/solitaryconfinement/ (last visited May 14, 
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to explain the situations in which “close confinement” 
is generally used by referencing the Istanbul Statement 
on the Use and Effects of  Solitary Confinement, adopted on 
December 9th, 2007 at the International Psychological 
Trauma Symposium in Istanbul.100  The Basic Principles for 
the Treatment of  Prisoners, the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee (referencing the ICCPR), the Committee against 
Torture, the Committee on the Rights of  the Child, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Rules for the Treat-
ment of  Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Wo-
men Offenders, Principles and Best Practices on the Protection 
of  Persons Deprived of  Liberty in the Americas, European 
Prison Rule 53, and the Istanbul Statement on the Use and 
Effects of  Solitary Confinement all condemn, in one form 
or another, the close confinement of  prisoners for the 
purposes of  inflicting disciplinary punishment.101  The 
distinction placed on close confinement as a means of  
inflicting punishment, however, cannot be ignored, as it is 
significantly different from, and does not rise to the le-
vel of, an absolute ban, although the authors openly em-
brace the recommendation of  prohibiting its use even 
when a prisoner is not being punished.102  The Commit-
tee against Torture, for instance, in recognition of  the 
harmful mental and physical effects of  prolonged soli-
tary confinement, has recommended the abolishment 
of  solitary confinement in all circumstances, except of  
course in the most extreme cases.103  Others, such as 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, have called for 
a more limited ban on the use of  close confinement, 
2012) & Bruce A Arrigo, Heather Y. Bersot, and Brian G. Sellers, 
The Ethics of  Total Confinement: A Critique of  Madness, Citizen-
ship, and Social Justice 60-92 (Oxford University Press, New York 
2011).
100  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners: Preliminary Observa-
tions 23 (According to the Istanbul Statement, solitary confinement 
is generally applied in four scenarios around the world: (i) to enforce 
disciplinary punishment on sentenced prisoners, (ii) to isolate in-
dividuals during an ongoing criminal investigation, (iii) to manage 
specific groups of  prisoners, and (iv) as a judicial sentence.  It is 
also used in some parts of  the world as a substitute for caring for 
mentally ill individuals, and as a means of  coercively interrogating 
certain individuals).
101  Id. at 23-4 (Basic Principles for the Treatment of  Prisoners 
(7): “Efforts addressed to the abolition of  solitary confinement as 
a punishment, or to the restriction of  its use, should be undertaken 
and encouraged”; UN Human Rights Committee, Comment No. 
20, paragraph 6: “The Committee notes that prolonged solitary con-
finement of  the detained or imprisoned person may amount to acts 
prohibited by article 7 (of  the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights)”).
102  Id. at 23.
103  Id.
such as a prohibition on solitary confinement exceeding 
fifteen straight days.104
In regards to a reduction of  diet as a means of  pu-
nishment, the notes and comments make clear that 
the International Community considers this a form of  
inhuman punishment.105  Such a form of  punishment is 
in violation of  the principles set forth in ICESCR and 
the ICCPR, as well as the Principles and Best Practices on the 
Protection of  Persons Deprived of  Liberty in the Americas.106  
What’s most notable about the analysis of  Rule 32(1), 
however, is the acknowledgment that the portion of  the 
Rule allowing for solitary confinement and reduction of  
diet as a form of  punishment, so long as a “medical 
officer has examined the prisoner and certified in wri-
ting that he is fit to sustain it”, is now a violation which 
“flies in the face” of  a doctor’s sense of  professional 
responsibility towards her patient.107 For if  a medical 
officer approves of  a prisoner’s fitness to undergo close 
confinement or a reduction of  diet, she would be in vio-
lation of  the Principles of  Medical Ethics relevant to the Role 
of  Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of  
Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.108  The authors’ 
condemnation of  this exception in the Rule indicates 
a willingness to revise it in the future, further updating 
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules and bringing it more 
fully into the 21st century. 
4. north KoreA’s violAtion oF the u.n. 
stAndArd minimum rules
Kim Il Sung, former leader and current Eternal Pre-
sident of  North Korea,109 once said that“[f]actionalists 
or enemies of  class, whoever they are, their seed must 
be eliminated through three generations.”110 This state-
104  Id. at 24.
105  Id.
106  Id.
107  Id. at 25.
108  Id.
109  Nicholas D. Kristof, “Death Doesn’t End Rule of  Kim Il 
Sung, ‘Eternal President’, The New York Times, Sept. 7, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/07/world/death-doesn-
t-end-rule-of-kim-il-sung-eternal-president.html (last visited May 
14, 2012).
110  Robert Park, North Korea and the Genocide Movement, 
Harvard International Review: Web Perspectives, Sept. 27, 2011, 
available at http://hir.harvard.edu/north-korea-and-the-genocide-
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ment is indicative of  a policy which treats anyone who 
questions or doubts the abilities of  the Dear Leader or 
the imminent success of  the Revolutionary effort as 
enemies unworthy of  living – as traitors to be thrown 
into concentration camps, where they will waste away 
and slowly be stripped of  their humanity. Such a policy 
leaves no room for the humane treatment of  political 
prisoners, especially given North Korea’s constant pro-
clamations to its citizens that enemies outside the coun-
try – the U.S., Japan, and any bourgeois imperialist – are 
threatening to undermine the Revolution.111
With this policy of  ill-treatment in mind, it is no 
wonder that former Yodok prisoners who have escaped 
North Korea attest to acts of  torture and cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment.  Indeed, prisoners at Yo-
dok are universally and without reason disciplined with 
excessive firmness (Rule 27), employed as secret infor-
mants in the service of  the camp, often against their 
will (Rule 28), disciplined with corporal punishment and 
other forms of  cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ment (Rule 31), and punished with extensive periods 
of  close confinement and reductions of  diet (Rule 32). 
The following ten Yodok practices will be discussed in 
detail, since they are vital in keeping the prisoners under 
control in Yodok, and are amongst the most inhumane 
practices testified to in Yodok: (1) beating and verbally 
abusing prisoners, (2) corporal punishment, (3) bea-
ting and verbally abusing child prisoners, (4) network 
of  informants, (5) prohibition on sexual activity be-
tween men and women, (6) obligation to attend public 
executions and participate in postmortem stoning, (7) 
punishment for failure to attend night class / not cri-
ticize well enough at a criticism session, (8) reduction 
of  diet as punishment, (9) the “sweatbox”, and (10) pu-
nishment cells.  Violations of  both the articles and the 
corresponding notes and comments will be accounted 
for by reference to the testimonials of  prisoners who 
managed to escape or be released from Yodok, as well 
as official NGO reports.  It must be emphasized here 
that a myriad of  other violations occur at the Yodok 
prison which are equally egregious and amoral in their 
own right, and should likewise be rectified as soon as 
possible.  These include a lack of  notice as to why a pri-
movement (last visited May 14, 2012).
111  SEE Hyung-chan and Dong-kyu Kim, Human Remolding in 
North Korea: A Social History of  Education (University Press of  
America, Inc., Maryland 2005).
soner is being sent to Yodok,112 lack of  a formal judicial 
process by which prisoners are properly sentenced,113 
wholly inadequate housing conditions114 and food 
rations,115 and the public execution of  prisoners.116 The 
latter violation, in order that it may be properly treated 
and analyzed, requires the writing of  a separate paper, 
focused solely on the policy of  public executions, its 
occurrence in Yodok and in other North Korean pri-
sons, and what the International Community should do 
to ensure its future prohibition.
4.1 Beating and Verbally Abusing Prisoners wi-
thout Cause
During a prisoner’s “normal” work hours, Yodok 
supervisors shout at, verbally abuse, and beat prisoners 
caught resting or working at a slower than acceptable 
pace.117  Guards have admitted to beating prisoners just 
because they can, and also because they genuinely felt 
that these prisoners were traitors of  the State.118  There 
have even been reports of  sexual abuse committed by 
the guards.119 Kang Chol-Hwan recalled a guard telling 
him that he didn’t deserve to live, and to be thankful 
112  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 10.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Ko-
rea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
113  Id.
114  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 50 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
115  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: The Lives 
and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 31.  U.S. 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 
2012); Yodok Stories 2008 (approx. 25:37).
116  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 57, 137 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
117  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 31-2.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003)31-2 (guards have been accused of  
beating prisoners with wooden sticks); Kenneth Chan, “N. Kore-
an Prison Camp Survivors Speak at UN Meeting”, The Christian 
Post, April 7, 2005, available at http://www.christianpost.com/
news/n-korean-prison-camp-survivors-speak-at-un-meeting-1325/ 
(last visited May 14, 2012); David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Sec-
ond Edition: The Lives and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the 
Mountains” 65.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 
(Washington, D.C. 2012) (Jung Gwang-il witnessed guards beating 
prisoners).
118  Yodok Stories 2008, available at http://www.yodokfilm.com/#/
english/people/ahn-myong-chol (last visited May 14, 2012)(Ahn 
Myong Chol, prison guard in Yodok and other camps in North Ko-
rea from 1987-1994).
119  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: The Lives 
and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 68.  U.S. 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 
2012).
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that the Party and the Great Leader had given him a 
chance to redeem himself.120  According to Kang, the 
guards were “almost all uneducated, rough people, of  a 
generally bad moral character”, who were carefully pi-
cked by the State so as to ensure a “good” background 
(being from a family of  peasants or poor workers with 
no “anti-Communist criminals”) and sufficient physical 
strength.121 
The routine and senseless beating and abusing of  
prisoners without cause is in violation of  Rule 27, since 
beating and abusing prisoners in such a manner consti-
tutes the use of  unnecessary force which does not fur-
ther the safe keeping of  prisoners or the maintenance 
of  a well-ordered community.122
4.2 Corporal Punishment 
Corporal punishment is a fairly common phenome-
non in Yodok.123  One former prisoner was beaten and 
forced to endure a sit-down-stand-up punishment124 for 
an extensive period of  time, rendering him unable to 
walk.125  The same prisoner was also beaten uncons-
cious126 with a burning piece of  wood, as punishment 
for not being able to complete his work.127  Another 
120  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 59 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
121  Id. at 59-60.
122  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 27, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012]; 
Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 17-8.
123  Yodok Stories 2008; David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Expos-
ing North Korea’s Prison Camps U.S. Committee for Human Rights 
in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
124  For the U.S.’s use of  this technique on detainees, SEE Brian 
Ross, “CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described”, ABC 
News, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
Investigation/story?id=1322866#.T7J7I-0zLww (last visited May 
15, 2012) (“’They would not let you rest, day or night. Stand up, sit 
down, stand up, sit down. Don’t sleep. Don’t lie on the floor,’ one 
prisoner said through a translator).
125  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 32.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Ko-
rea (Washington, D.C. 2003); Kim Song A, “’Pigeon Torture’, Will-
ing to Surrender Life”, Daily NK, May 3, 2007, available at http://
www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=2012 
(last visited May 15, 2012) (“Kim said, ‘Once you are made to sit and 
stand 500 times with a blanket on top of  you in a hot stuffy room 
full of  prisoners, you no longer see yourself  as human’”).
126  Yodok Stories 2008 (approx. 32:02 – if  a prisoner dies during a 
beating, it doesn’t really matter).
127  Kenneth Chan, “N. Korean Prison Camp Survivors Speak at 
UN Meeting”, The Christian Post, April 7, 2005, available at http://
prisoner was put in the “pigeon position”,128 whereby 
his hands were cuffed behind his back as he was hung 
from a ceiling for two to three days.129  A former Yodok 
prisoner, going by the name Kim Kwang Soo, described 
the use of  the pigeon torture at Yodok in gruesome 
detail during a Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Hu-
man Rights:
“Your hands are tied behind your back and 
handcuffed to an iron bar. You cannot sit or stand. 
After a day of  being in this position, your muscles 
tense up and your chest sticks out like the breastplate 
of  a bird. Your whole body becomes stiff.”130
The use of  the sweatbox and punishment cells, dis-
cussed later in this paper, are also forms of  corporal pu-
nishment, used to punish prisoners for the most minor 
and trifling of  offenses.131
Any form of  corporal punishment is expressly pro-
hibited by Rule 31, specifically when used as a means of  
punishment for disciplinary offenses.132  Here, forcing 
prisoners to endure sit-down-stand-up punishments, 
beating them unconscious with burning pieces of  wood, 
and placing them in a “pigeon position” as a disciplina-
ry measure, in addition to the use of  the sweatbox and 
punishment cells, runs directly contrary to Rule 31.
4.3 Beating and Verbally Abusing Child Priso-
ners
Not surprisingly, Yodok takes a harsh approach to-
wards the children of  political criminals.  Teachers in 
Yodok are notorious for addressing child prisoners “in 
the harshest, crudest manner”, beating students and 
subjecting them to humiliating and degrading punish-
www.christianpost.com/news/n-korean-prison-camp-survivors-
speak-at-un-meeting-1325/ (last visited May 14, 2012).
128  Kim Song A, “’Pigeon Torture’, Willing to Surrender Life”, 
Daily NK, May 3, 2007, available at http://www.dailynk.com/eng-
lish/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=2012 (last visited May 15, 
2012).
129  AmnestyInternational, “’Hell holes’: North Korea’s secret 
prison camps”, YouTube, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=1y0yhV6IT7o (last visited May 14, 2012).
130  Kim Song A, “’Pigeon Torture’, Willing to Surrender Life”, 
Daily NK, May 3, 2007, available at http://www.dailynk.com/eng-
lish/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=2012 (last visited May 15, 
2012).
131  SEE (9) (the “sweatbox”) and (10) (punishment cells).
132  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art, 31, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012]
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ments.133  Students are made to feel less than human,134 
and are assigned hard labor if  they show the slightest 
bit of  resistance towards their revolver-wielding tea-
chers.135  For instance, a teacher punished his students 
by making them stand naked in the courtyard with their 
hands behind their backs.136 One teacher, nicknamed 
“The Old Fox” by Kang Chol-Hwan and his friends, 
made his students peel walnuts until their hands were 
stained black, and then made them rub their hands back 
and forth until they were clean, crushing their hands 
with his boot if  they failed to comply.137 One story is 
particularly disturbing:
One time a friend of  mine from class started 
complaining to us because he’d been picked for the 
nasty job [cleaning stalls and emptying septic tanks] 
several times in a row…
Someone must have gone to squeal to the Wild 
Boar [students’ nickname for their teacher], because 
a minute later we saw him walking toward us 
looking mad as hell. He grabbed the guilty student 
and started beating him savagely, first punching him 
with his clenched fists, then kicking him.  Battered 
and wobbly-legged, the boy fell  into the septic 
tank…my friend managed to reach the edge and 
climb out, but he was in such a sad state that no 
one wanted to help him wash up or bandage his 
wounds.  A few days later he died.138
Treating children in this manner is in violation of  
Rule 27, in that it is not necessary for the safe custody 
and maintenance of  a well-ordered community,139 and is 
also not humane.140  Such a policy is also in violation of  
Rule 31, in that the beating of  students constitutes cor-
poral punishment141 (excessive chastisement ordered as 
punishment so as to discipline the student and educate 
133  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 63-71 (Basic Books, New York 2005) (one teacher pun-
ished his students by making them stand naked in the courtyard with 
their hands behind their backs.  Another beat a student to death).
134  Id. (A teacher ordered a student to go on all fours and say 
“I’m a dog”). 
135  Id.
136  Id.
137  Id. at 69; 71 (as punishment for riding a teacher’s bike, stu-
dents were given a week of  supplementary night work, which in-
cluded digging ditches and filling them with rocks).
138  Id. at 68.
139  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 27, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
140  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 17-8.
141  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 31, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
him as to how to behave in the future).142  The physical 
and verbal abusing of  children also constitutes cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, which is prohibited 
in all instances, disciplinary or otherwise.143
4.4 Network of informants
Yodok maintains a network of  informants who 
report to the Yodok prison guards regarding any trea-
sonous or anti-State comments made by prisoners, in-
cluding talks of  escape.144  Similar to the camps in the 
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Yodok designates cer-
tain prisoners to have authoritative power over others, 
including the power to punish prisoners by denouncing 
them to the guards.145  These informants, who are cho-
sen without the other prisoners knowing, are often ti-
mes picked against their will and without consideration 
as to their opinion, since becoming an informant means 
alienation from your friends and family.146  It also means 
that prisoners are less likely to band together to fight for 
their rights, although inmates become adept at spotting 
informants over time.147  Regardless, talking too freely 
in front of  an informant can lead to severe punishment, 
including extra hard labor, a reduction in diet, and time 
in the “sweatbox.”148 Indeed, the system is an extensive 
and pervasive one, making any sort of  collaborating and 
scheming highly unlikely:
The informants were at every turn.  There was 
no one to confide in, no way to tell who was who. 
The only advice [their] fellow prisoners could 
offer was to have patience: they [Kang’s father and 
142  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 22.
143  Id.
144  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 77, 103-108-9 (Basic Books, New York 2005); Chico 
Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged abuses at North 
Korea’s prison camps”, The Washington Post, May 9, 2012, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-
camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited May 15, 
2012).
145  Id. at 57-8 (“The brigade chiefs are important links in the 
chain of  command between the camp’s authorities and the common 
detainee”).
146  Id. at 77, 103-108-9
147  Id.
148  Id. at 77, 103-108-9; Chico Harlan, “South Korean report de-
tails alleged abuses at North Korea’s prison camps”, The Washing-
ton Post, May 9, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-
north-koreas-prison-camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.
html (last visited May 14, 2012).
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uncle] would learn to pick out the  snitches soon 
enough.  Until then, they would do well to keep 
their thoughts to themselves.149
On at least some occasions, prisoners would on their 
own volition inform guards about other prisoners com-
plaining, in the hopes of  avoiding punishment them-
selves.150
The maintenance of  this network of  informants is 
in violation of  Rule 28(1), in that these informants are 
in a sense “employed” in the service of  the institution 
in a disciplinary capacity, since their reports to Yodok 
guards regarding what prisoners are saying could land 
those prisoners in serious trouble.151  Their work in in-
forming the guards of  what other prisoners are saying 
also runs contrary to the idea that some prisoners 
should not have any disciplinary or authoritarian power 
over others.152  In addition, the network of  informants 
in Yodok does not fall under the exception stated in 
Rule 28, since the existence of  secret informants does 
not go to the “proper functioning of  systems based on 
self-government”, such as social, educational, or athletic 
groups.153  This network also undermines the principle 
that prisons should foster as healthy and positive an en-
vironment as possible, devoid of  distrust and fear, since 
informants are likely to abuse their delegated powers in 
order to win favor with the Yodok guards.154
149  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 77 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
150  Id. at 77; Chico Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged 
abuses at North Korea’s prison camps”, The Washington Post, May 
9, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_
pacific/south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-
prison-camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited 
May 14, 2012).
151  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 77, 103-108-9 (Basic Books, New York 2005); Chico 
Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged abuses at North 
Korea’s prison camps”, The Washington Post, May 9, 2012, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-
camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited May 14, 
2012).
152  Analysis of  Extent of  Applicability of  the U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners to Community-
Based Supervision and Residential Care for Convicted Offenders 
12.
153  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 28(1), 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
154  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 19-20.
4.5 Prohibition on Sexual Activity between Men 
and Women
One especially harsh disciplinary measure taken at 
Yodok, consistent with Kim Il Sung’s philosophy of  
rooting out the enemy seed, is the prohibition on sexual 
activity between men and women.155  Although Rule 8 of  
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules states that men and 
women should be “detained in separate institutions”,156 
Yodok is organized such that entire families are placed 
in specific villages, which means that men and women 
are interacting on a consistent basis, including with their 
spouses.157   It is only natural, then, that these men and 
women will engage in sexual activity, activity which is 
not expressly barred by the U.N. Standard Minimum 
Rules or by any other binding or non-binding inter-
national instrument.  In Yodok, however, were a man 
and woman to engage in sexual activity and get caught, 
the man would be physically punished, and the woman 
would be forced to recount her sexual encounters in 
front of  the entire village of  prisoners.158 One former 
prisoner stated that women who got pregnant were im-
posed an additional six months in prison, while their 
male counterparts were sentenced to another two.159  If  
the woman managed to conceal her pregnancy from 
the guards and have a baby, Yodok guards would ensure 
that the baby did not survive by either abandoning it in 
the mountains, or by burying it in the ground.160
Such a policy is in violation of  Rule 27, in that it 
goes beyond that which is necessary for safe custody 
and maintenance of  a well-ordered community,161 and 
because it promotes treating prisoners inhumanely and 
with no respect for their human dignity, especially sin-
155  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 35.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Ko-
rea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
156  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ref-
world/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
157  SEE Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums 
of  Pyongyang 47-159 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
158  Id. at 145-6.
159  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: The Lives 
and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 68.  U.S. 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 
2012) (one male was actually transferred to the “total control zone”).
160  Id.
161  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 27, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
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ce it prohibits them from engaging in normal human 
behavior.162  Forcing the women to recount their sexual 
activities in front of  an entire village of  prisoners is in 
violation of  Rule 31, in that it is a degrading punish-
ment used to discipline the prisoner.163
4.6 Obligation to attend Public Executions and 
participate in Postmortem stoning
Once Yodok considers you an adult prisoner (which 
is at age fifteen),164 you are obligated to attend public 
executions of  prisoners.165  Executions are generally 
carried out when a prisoner tries to escape, and are done 
in public so as to intimidate those with similar ideas.166 
Once the prisoner is shot dead,167 prisoners are requi-
red to stone the dead body and shout State-approved 
propaganda lines (i.e. “down with the traitors of  the 
people”).168  According to Kang Chol-Hwan, prisoners 
at Yodok learn to adapt to this otherwise cruel and un-
necessary requirement, undoubtedly designed for the 
162  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 17-8.
163  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 31, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
164  There have been varying testimonies as to when prisoners 
are required to view public executions.  For instance, former Yodok 
prisoner Kim Tae Jin has stated that children are required to watch 
public executions.  SEE Yodok Stories 2008, available http://www.
yodokfilm.com/#/english/people/kim-tae-jin (last visited May 14, 
2012).
165  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 137-41 (Basic Books, New York 2005); “North Korea: 
Irrefutable Satellite Evidence of  Prison Camps in North Korea”, 
Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/re-
search/science-for-human-rights/north-korea (last visited May 14, 
2012).
166  “North Korea: Irrefutable Satellite Evidence of  Prison 
Camps in North Korea”, Amnesty International, available at http://
www.amnestyusa.org/research/science-for-human-rights/north-
korea (last visited May 14, 2012); David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, 
Second Edition: The Lives and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to 
the Mountains” 65. U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2012).
167  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 139 (Basic Books, New York 2005) (“The custom was 
to shoot three salvos from a distance of  five yards.  The first salvo 
cut the topmost cords, killing the condemned man and causing his 
head to fall forward.  The second salvo cut the chords around his 
chest and bent him forward further.  The third salvo released his last 
tether, allowing the man’s body to drop into the pit in front of  him, 
his tomb.  This simplified the burial”).
168  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps 35.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Ko-
rea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
purpose of  instilling fear in anyone watching.169  
Forcing prisoners to watch public executions is in 
violation of  Rule 27, in that requiring them to watch 
other prisoners get killed and stone their dead bodies 
does not show respect for the inherent dignity of  peo-
ple, since the majority of  human beings do not wish to 
desecrate and yell at the dead body of  a fellow victim.170 
These two requirements are also in violation of  Rule 31, 
since making people watch executions and stone dead 
bodies is cruel, inhuman and degrading, especially in ca-
ses where a parent, sibling, or relative must observe and 
desecrate the victim.171
4.7 Punishment for Failure to Attend Night Class 
/ Not Criticize Well Enough at a Criticism Session
All North Korean citizens are required to attend mee-
tings whereby they criticize themselves and others for 
their shortcomings in helping the Revolutionary cause.172 
While normally a North Korean citizen will not be se-
verely punished for failing to adequately self-criticize or 
criticize others,173 this is not the case at Yodok, where 
such sessions are taken much more seriously.174  These 
bi-weekly meetings are made worse by the fact that they 
are held at night, when prisoners could be getting some 
much-needed sleep, since the camp considers them ab-
solutely necessary to the political rehabilitation of  priso-
ners.175  Furthermore, all Yodok prisoners must attend 
these meetings, unless particularly extenuating circums-
tances permit otherwise.176  Kang Chol Hwan states that 
169  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 141 (Basic Books, New York 2005) (“I don’t blame the 
prisoners who unaffectedly went about their business.  People who 
are hungry don’t have the heart to think about others”).
170  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 17-8; Kang Chol-Hwan 
and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  Pyongyang 140 (Basic 
Books, New York 2005) (“Once both men were finally dead, the 
two or three thousand prisoners in attendance were instructed to 
each pick up a stone and hurl it at the corpses while yelling ‘Down 
with the traitors of  the people!’.  We did as we were told, but our 
disgust was written all over our faces.  Most of  us closed our eyes, or 
lowered our heads, to avoid seeing the mutiliated bodies”).
171  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 31, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
172  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 127 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
173  Id.
174  Id. at 125-30.
175  Id.
176  Id.
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such sessions were not taken seriously or personally by 
most of  the adult prisoners, who knew that such sessions 
were just part of  North Korea’s attempts to indoctrinate 
its citizens, even while they suffer in one of  its prisons.177 
These criticism and self-criticism sessions are in vio-
lation of  Rule 27, since they serve no real purpose in 
maintaining a well-ordered community life.  The argu-
ment that prisoners will be more likely to follow camp 
rules if  they attend these sessions is undermined by the 
fact that prisoners must perform forced labor under clo-
se and often times abusive supervision.  Furthermore, 
attempting to pit prisoners against each other in these 
sessions creates a wholly inhospitable atmosphere which 
is in violation of  the spirit of  the U.N. Standard Mini-
mum Rules.178
4.8 Reduction of Diet as Punishment
Reduction of  diet as a form of  punishment is used 
in a number of  instances at Yodok.  A prisoner who 
fails to meet his work quota, for instance, could see his 
food ration cut in half.179  In addition, any prisoner who 
is considered “unbalanced” (i.e. mentally unstable) is 
given food to eat in direct proportion to the amount 
of  work he can do.180  This is also the case for normal, 
mentally stable prisoners, who may suffer a reduction 
of  diet if  the entire work group fails to meet a day’s 
quota.181  A prisoner may also see his diet reduced if  he 
fails a memorization test (i.e. of  a Kim Il Sung speech 
or an important date in the Party’s history).182  In addi-
177  Id.
178  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 27, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012].
179  Chico Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged abuses at 
North Korea’s prison camps”, The Washington Post, May 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-
camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited May 14, 
2012) (“laborers who failed to meet work quotas saw their meager 
food rations cut in half, a cycle that led to starvation because the less 
they ate, the weaker they got, and the poorer they became at work”).
180  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 123-4 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
181  Amnesty International, “’Hell Holes”: North Korea’s secret 
prison camps”, YouTube, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=1y0yhV6IT7o (last visited May 14, 2012); 
Kenneth Chan, “N. Korean Prison Camp Survivors Speak at UN 
Meeting”, The Christian Post, April 7, 2005, available at http://www.
christianpost.com/news/n-korean-prison-camp-survivors-speak-
at-un-meeting-1325/ (last visited May 14, 2012).
182  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
tion, prisoners sent to the “sweatbox” or punishment 
cell (discussed in greater detail below) have their already 
meager diets drastically reduced.183  
The reduction of  a prisoner’s diet in the aforemen-
tioned instances is in violation of  Rule 32(1), since pu-
nishment by reduction of  diet shall never be inflicted,184 
and since such a punishment is considered inhumane.185
4.9 The “Sweatbox”
The “sweatbox”, a torture device commonly used 
to punish prisoners for the most trifling of  offenses, 
has been cited by former prisoners and human rights 
NGOs as one of  the harshest torture devices used in 
Yodok.186  The use of  the sweatbox dates back to the 
United States in the 19th century, where it was used as a 
form of  naval discipline.187  This torture device has also 
Prison Camps 31-2.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea (Washington, D.C. 2003).
183  Id. at 94-6; David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: 
The Lives and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 
65.  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washing-
ton, D.C. 2012); Chico Harlan, “South Korean report details alleged 
abuses at North Korea’s prison camps, The Washington Post, May 9, 
2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pa-
cific/south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-
prison-camps/2012/05/09/gIQA794LDU_story.html (last visited 
May 14, 2012) (“Those who complained about conditions were 
frequently betrayed by fellow prisoners, Jeong said… Often, Jeong 
himself  informed guards about such misbehavior. “Some people 
would say, ‘This is worse than being dead.’ And I’d report it. Then 
the person would be taken to solitary confinement for one month 
and given one meal per day’”).
184  North Korea is not the only country which uses a reduction 
of  diet as a means of  punishment.  In prisons throughout the U.S., 
certain prisoners are served what is called “Nutriloaf ” as a punitive 
and nutritional punishment for bad behavior.  Nutriloaf, or “prison 
loaf ” as it is sometimes called, is food grounded up and baked in 
loaves and served to prisoners (often those in solitary confinement) 
as a form of  punishment.  Though it purportedly has the same 
nutritional value as the food served to other prisoners, prisoners 
who have eaten it have gotten violently ill and have lost a substantial 
amount of  weight as a result of  eating Nutriloaf  on a daily basis. 
For more SEE Adam Cohen, “Can Food Be Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment?”, TIME, April 2, 2012, available at http://ideas.time.
com/2012/04/02/can-food-be-cruel-and-unusual-punishment/ 
(last visited May 14, 2012), & Matthew Purdy, “What’s Worse Than 
Solitary Confinement? Just Taste This, The New York Times, Au-
gust 4, 2002, available at http://www.fedcrimlaw.com/visitors/Pris-
onLore/TheLoaf.html (last visited May 14, 2012).
185  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 22-3.
186  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 94 (Basic Books, New York 2005) (Kang Chol-Hwan 
described it as one of  the harshest punishments thought possible)
187  Darius Rejali, “Ice Water and Sweatboxes: The long and sa-
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been utilized by the Japanese during World War II on 
POWs,188 and by the Chinese on South Koreans during 
the Korean War.189 
The sweatbox itself  is a “kind of  shack…devoid of  
any openings” and shrouded in total darkness.190  It is ex-
tremely small and cramped, such that the prisoner can-
not fully stand or lie down, forcing him to crouch on his 
knees.191  This close confinement punishment is made 
worse by the fact that the prisoners are prohibited from 
talking or gesturing, except when sick or asking to go to 
the bathroom.192  If  they talk or make any unnecessary 
gestures, they are beaten and abused by the guards (in 
one case, the guards tied the hands of  a prisoner behind 
his back and shoved his nose into a septic tank).193  The 
diet of  a prisoner in the sweatbox is also reduced, lea-
ding him to eat anything that crawls within his grasp.194 
Prisoners must silently starve in the sweatbox for days 
or weeks at a time, and such severe treatment has been 
reported to have a lasting impact on survivors.195
The existence and use of  the sweatbox as a means 
of  discipline and punishment is in violation of  Rule 
31, in that placing prisoners in the sweatbox constitu-
tes corporal punishment.196  It is also in violation of  
Rule 31 because the prisoner is placed in a dark cell, 
and because the very use of  this torture device constitu-
tes cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.197  The 
sweatbox is also in violation of  Article 32(1), since it is 
by its very nature punishment by close confinement,198 
distic history behind the CIA’s torture techniques”, Slate, March 17, 
2009, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli-
tics/jurisprudence/2009/03/ice_water_and_sweatboxes.2.html 
(“They were a standard part of  naval discipline, and the word sweat-
box comes from the Civil War era”).
188  Id. (“The Japanese used them in POW camps in World War 
II. They are still common in East Asia”).
189  Id. (“They are still common in East Asia. The Chinese used 
them during the Korean War, and Chinese prisoners today relate ac-
counts of  squeeze cells (xiaohao, literally “small number”), dark cells 
(heiwu), and extremely hot or cold cells”).
190  Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of  
Pyongyang 94 (Basic Books, New York 2005).
191  Id.
192  Id.
193  Id.
194  Id.
195  Id.
196  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
Prisoners Art. 31, 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012]
197  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 22.
198  United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of  
and since such confinement involves “extensive sensory 
deprivation” (especially light) and “deprivation of  any 
human contact or stimulation.”199  Finally, the reduction 
in diet constitutes a violation of  Article 32(1) because 
such punishment is expressly prohibited.200
4.10 Punishment Cells
Prisoners at the Yodok concentration camp also face 
the possibility of  being sent to a “punishment cell”,201 a 
sentence often spelling death for the already weakened 
prisoner.202  Like the sweatbox, prisoners are unable to 
move in these cells,203 are deprived of  light and human 
contact, and are fed very little (in punishment cells, the 
diet is 10 grams a day).204  Former prisoners have stated 
that people are sent to these cells anywhere from ten 
to forty-five days, and that those who manage to come 
out alive are too weak to even walk, dying soon after 
being released from the cell.205  While the sweatbox and 
punishment cells are similar in many respects, a major 
difference between them is that, in the punishment ce-
lls, prisoners have a rope tied around their neck, and are 
forced to sit in the cramped cell with this rope around 
their neck for up to six months, significantly longer than 
the time prisoners spend in the sweatbox.206
The existence and use of  the punishment cell, as 
with the existence and use of  the sweatbox, is in viola-
tion of  Rules 31 and 32(1).
Prisoners Art. 32(1), 30 August 1955, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html [accessed 14 May 2012]
199  Notes and comments on the United Nations Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of  Prisoners 22-4.
200  Id.
201 “North Korea: Images reveal scale of  political prison camps”, 
Amnesty International, May 4, 2011, available at http://www.am-
nestyusa.org/news/press-releases/north-korea-images-reveal-scale-
of-political-prison-camps (last visited April 7, 2012).
202  Yodok Stories 2008 (approx. 26:10).
203  Id.
204  Id.
205  David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Second Edition: The Lives 
and Voices of  “Those Who are Sent to the Mountains” 65.  U.S. 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Washington, D.C. 
2012). (“Just outside the Sorimchon section there was a punishment 
facility for ‘rule violators.’ Rule breakers were sent to this prison 
within the prison camp for 10-45 days and almost everyone died 
shortly after release. Mr. Kim…knew three persons sent to the pun-
ishment cells, one person for ‘stealing’ honey, another for eating raw 
corn intended for the animals, and one woman who had sex with 
another prisoner. All three died upon release from the punishment 
cells”); ALSO SEE 66.
206  Yodok Stories 2008 (approx. 20:41 to 21:42).
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5. reActions oF the internAtionAl community
5.1 The Working Group on the Universal Perio-
dic Review
So how has the international community –specifi-
cally the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Re-
view, the General Assembly, and the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on Human Rights in North Korea - dealt with 
these blatant violations of  the U.N. Standard Minimum 
Rules?  As can be expected, North Korea denies the 
existence of  any political prison camps in its country. 
North Korean representatives made such a denial at a 
recent convening of  The Working Group on the Uni-
versal Period Review, established pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution 5/1 on June 18th, 2007.207 
The Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”), set up by the 
Human Rights Council, analyzes the human rights si-
tuations of  all 193 U.N. Member States with each coun-
try being looked at once every four years.208 The UPR 
Working Group consists of  forty-seven members of  
the Human Rights Council (although any U.N. Member 
State can take part in the review) who review a country 
according to the human rights standards set forth in va-
rious human rights treaties.209  The goal of  the UPR is 
to comprehensively assess the human rights situation in 
every country, offer non-binding recommendations and 
assistance if  necessary, and have the State assume pri-
mary responsibility for implementing the recommenda-
tions.210  NGOs may participate in the process as well.211
North Korea last submitted a report during the sixth 
session of  the Human Rights Council Working Group 
on the Universal Periodic Review, held in Geneva from 
November 30th to December 11th, 2009.212 In chapter 
IV (“Efforts and Experiences in the Protection and 
Promotion of  Human Rights”), subsection 1(C), Nor-
207  Report of  the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Re-
view: Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, U.N. General Assem-
bly, A/HRC/13/13, Jan. 4, 2010.
208  “Basic Facts about the UPR”, United Nations Human Rights, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/
BasicFacts.aspx (last visited May 14, 2012).
209  Id.
210  Id.
211  Id.
212  National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 
15(A) of  the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, U.N. General Assembly 
A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, Aug. 27, 2009.
th Korea claims that torture and other inhuman treat-
ment is strictly prohibited by their Criminal Procedures 
Law, particularly forcing a suspect to admit an offense 
by torture or beating.213  In subsection 4, meanwhile, 
North Korea claims that it cooperates with Internatio-
nal Human Rights NGOs, although such groups have 
been calling on North Korea for years to cease the ope-
ration of  the Yodok concentration camp, which North 
Korea officially denies exists.214  What’s perhaps most 
perplexing, however, is the accusations it lays out in 
chapter V (“Obstacles and Challenges to the Protection 
and Promotion of  Human Rights”).  In subsection one, 
North Korea claims that the U.S. is pursuing a “hostile 
policy” towards North Korea which “poses the greatest 
challenge to the enjoyment of  genuine human rights 
by the Korean people.”215  In subsection 2, meanwhile, 
North Korea claims that the “EU in collusion with Ja-
pan and other forces hostile to the DPRK has adopted 
every year since 2003 the anti-DPRK ‘human rights re-
solution’ at the Commission on Human Rights, Human 
Rights Council and UN General Assembly.”216  North 
Korea goes on to say that:
These “resolutions” aim at tarnishing the image 
of  the DPRK and thereby achieving political 
purpose of  eliminating the ideas and system that 
the Korean people have chosen for themselves 
and defended, and not at the genuine protection 
and promotion of  human rights. The sponsors 
of  the “resolution” preposterously argue that 
they are aimed at promoting “cooperation” and 
“collaboration” for the “protection and promotion 
of  human rights”. However, the reality speaks by 
itself  that the “resolutions” are the root source of  
mistrust and confrontation, and the impediments to 
international cooperation
This sort of  evasiveness and circular reasoning is 
indicative of  a country that is unwilling to hold itself  
accountable for the egregious human rights violations 
committed at Yodok.
213  Id. at 8.
214  “North Korea: Demand the closure of  an inhumane prison 
camp”, Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnesty.
ca/writeathon/?page_id=3489 (last visited May 14, 2012) (“[t]he 
North Korean government denies that any political prison camps 
exist, even though satellite photographs and testimony collected by 
Amnesty International from former guards and former prisoners 
confirm their existence”).
215  National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 
15(A) of  the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 15, U.N. General Assembly 
A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, Aug. 27, 2009.
216  Id. at 16.
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The Working Group reviewed North Korea’s report 
on human rights on December 7th, 2009, and issued a 
report two days later, which was subsequently published 
on January 4th, 2010.217 In its report, the Working Group 
noted that the North Korean delegation denied the 
existence of  any political prison camps, although the 
delegation eerily referred to the existence of  “reform 
institutions”:
On the issue of  “political prisoners’ camps”, 
the delegation noted that freedoms of  speech, 
press, assembly and demonstration and freedom 
of  religious belief  are the  fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Exercising the rights to such freedom can never 
be criminalized. Thoughts and political views are 
not something that can be controlled by the law. 
The term “political prisoner”  does not exist in 
DPRK’s vocabulary, and therefore the so-called 
political prisoners’ camps do not exist. There 
are reform institutions, which are called prisons 
in other countries. Those who are sentenced to the 
penalty of  reform  through labour for committing 
anti-State crimes or other crimes prescribed in 
the Criminal Law serve their terms at the reform 
institutions.218 (emphasis added)
Despite North Korea’s insistence that these camps 
do not exist, numerous countries participating in this 
working group session, including South Korea, the Ne-
therlands, and France, expressed concerns about the use 
of  torture in North Korea and the existence of  prison 
camps, although no explicit reference to Yodok is ma-
de.219 In addition, the Working Group recommended that 
North Korea “[c]ooperate with the special rapporteurs 
and other United Nations human rights mechanisms by 
granting them access to the country”,220 “positively con-
sider requests for country visits of  special procedures of  
the Council and implement the recommendations stem-
ming from United Nations human rights mechanisms”, 
“[g]rant access to the three thematic Special Rapporteurs 
who have requested a visit”, “[r]espond favourably to 
the request of  special procedures mandate- holders to 
enter the country and cooperate with special procedu-
res and other human rights mechanisms”, and “[e]nsure 
that all persons deprived of  their liberty are treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of  
217  Id.
218  Id.
219  Id.
220  Report of  the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Re-
view: Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 15, U.N. General As-
sembly, A/HRC/13/13, Jan. 4, 2010.
the human being,”221 amongst other recommendations. 
Among the one-hundred-and-sixty-seven recommenda-
tions, North Korea did not support fifty of  them, in-
cluding “recogniz[ing] the mandate of  the Special Rap-
porteur on the situation of  human rights, cooperat[ing] 
with him and grant[ing] him access”, “grant[ing] access, 
as a matter of  priority, to the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of  human rights in DPRK”, “[c]ooperat[ing] 
more intensively with United Nations human rights me-
chanisms, in particular by responding positively to the 
repeated requests for visits by the Special Rapporteurs 
on the situation of  human rights and the right to food”, 
and “[a]gree[ing] to requests for a visit by the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights”.222
In the same Working Group session which analyzed 
North Korea’s national report, the Working Group 
looked at reports from fifteen other countries, inclu-
ding Albania, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo.223  Of  the sixteen countries exami-
ned in this session, twelve received eighty-five or more 
recommendations, with Cote d’Ivoire receiving 147, 
second only to North Korea’s 167.224  While most of  
these countries, supported almost all of  the Working 
Group’s recommendations,225 North Korea did not su-
pport 50 of  its 167 recommendations,226 which was the 
highest percentage of  denial in the session.227
5.2 U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
North Korea’s report on its human rights situation, 
and the Working Group’s response, is indicative of  Nor-
221  Id. at 17.
222  Id. at 20 (North Korea also did not support the recommenda-
tion to “[d]evelop cooperation on the issues of  human rights with 
international organizations and their mechanisms, in particular by 
engaging constructively with the Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of  human rights and responding positively to offers of  technical as-
sistance by OHCHR”).
223  The eleven other countries include Brunei Darussalam, Bhu-
tan, Cote d’lvoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Cambodia, Norway, and Portugal.
224  Report of  the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cote 
d’Ivoire, U.N. General Assembly, A/HRC/13/9, Jan. 4, 2010.
225  BUT SEE Report of  the Working Group on the Universal Peri-
odic Review: Ethiopia, U.N. General Assembly, A/HRC/13/17, Jan. 4, 
2010 (Ethiopia denied 32 of  the 142 recommendations made to it).
226  Report of  the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, U.N. General Assembly, A/
HRC/13/13, Jan. 4, 2010.
227  For the Sixth Session, SEE http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HR-
Bodies/UPR/Pages/MeetingsHighlightsSession6.aspx (last visited 
May 14, 2012).
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th Korea’s reluctance to participate actively and honestly 
regarding its violations of  a prisoner’s fundamental hu-
man rights, specifically the existence of  the Yodok con-
centration camp.  The U.N. General Assembly however, 
has taken an important step in creating awareness regar-
ding the existence of  prison camps in North Korea.  The 
main deliberative and policymaking organ of  the U.N., 
the General Assembly, which is comprised of  all 193 U.N. 
Member States,228 has raised awareness of  the dire situa-
tion in Yodok through both implementation of  the afo-
rementioned Working Group and by passing resolutions 
regarding the existence of  prison camps and the use of  
torture therein.229 But the recommendations put forth in 
the Working Group report and in the GA resolutions are 
non-binding, and only have power in so far as they in-
fluence other U.N. bodies with legally binding capabilities.
5.3 U.N. Special Rapporteur of Human Rights
The Special Rapporetur on the situation of  human 
rights in North Korea was established by the Com-
mission on Human Rights in 2004 under resolution 
2004/13.230  In his most recent report on North Ko-
rea, the Rapporteur – Marzuki Darusman231 - talked 
extensively about detention and correctional facilities 
in North Korea, including the existence of  political 
prison camps.”232  Specifically, the Special Rapporteur 
noted North Korea’s reference to such camps in its own 
legal instruments (Article 18 of  its Sentences and De-
228  General Assembly of  the United Nations, available at http://
www.un.org/en/ga/ (last visited May 15, 2012).
229  60/173. Situation of  human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of  Korea, A/RES/60/173, March 14, 2006; 61/174. Situa-
tion of  human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, 
A/RES/61/174, March 2007; 62/167. Situation of  human rights in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, A/RES/62/167, Feb. 
2008; 63/190. Situation of  human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of  Korea, A/RES/63/190, Feb. 2009; 64/175. Situation 
of  human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, A/
RES/64/175, March 2010; 65/225. Situation of  human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, A/RES/65/225, March 
2011; 66/174. Situation of  human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of  Korea, A/RES/66/174, March 2012. 
230  Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, U.N. General Assembly, A/
HRC/16/58, Feb. 2011 (the Rapporteur also said that such camps 
are operated by the “Farm Guidance Bureau of  the State Security 
Agency.”  The latter may also be another name for the National 
Security Agency).
231  “Scuffle after North Korea rejects UN rights report”, BBC, 
March 13, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-17348611 (last visited May 15, 2012).
232  SEE FN 232, supra.
cisions Enforcement Law), the flagrant human rights 
violations (including torture) occurring therein, and the 
need to prompt North Korea to improve the human 
rights situation in these camps.233  As with the General 
Assembly Working Group and GA Resolutions, the su-
ggestions of  the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
are non-binding, and depend in large part on North 
Korea’s willingness to comply and amend its ways, a wi-
llingness it has not shown thus far.
6. WAys oF Applying pressure on north Ko-
reA to close yodoK
In light of  North Korea’s hostile response to 
the Working Group’s recommendations pursuant 
to the UPR, and considering the GA’s U.N. Special 
Rapporteur’s findings on the matter, it is important to 
consider the methods and mechanisms which are avai-
lable for applying pressure on North Korea to close 
Yodok.  For one, the U.N. Security Council, an organ 
of  the U.N. which is charged with the maintenance of  
international peace and security,234 could pass a resolu-
tion calling on the North Korean Government to ei-
ther close the Yodok camp, or to at least cooperate with 
Special Rapporteurs and the Human Rights Council. 
Generally, the Security Council can settle any dispute 
which is likely to endanger international peace and se-
curity, and may investigate the dispute and recommend 
ways of  resolving it.235  If  it determines that there exists 
a threat to the peace, a breach of  the peace, or an act 
of  aggression, it may call on States to apply sanctions 
towards the offending State (Article 41), or can call on 
the States to take military action in order to restore pea-
ce and security.236  In recent years, the Security Council 
has passed resolutions calling on countries and regions 
to improve their human rights situations.  It has also 
helped ensure the inclusion of  human rights provisions 
in peace agreements, has facilitated the elimination of  
the use of  children in armed conflicts, and has included 
human rights protections in the work of  its Counter-
233  Id.
234  United Nations, Charter of  the United Nations, 24 October 
1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 15 May 2012].
235  Id.
236  Id.
PA
PA
IN
, T
om
 T
he
od
or
e .
 T
he
 U
.N
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
M
in
im
um
 R
ul
es
 fo
r t
he
 T
re
at
m
en
t o
f 
Pr
iso
ne
rs
 an
d 
N
or
th
 K
or
ea
: H
ow
 N
or
th
 K
or
ea
 is
 V
io
lat
in
g 
th
es
e R
ul
es
 w
ith
 it
s O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e Y
od
ok
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
Ca
m
p.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
10
, n
. 2
, 2
01
3 
p.
 1
01
-1
24
124
-Terrorism Committee.237  In 2012, for instance, the Se-
curity Council called on the Western Sahara238 and the 
Middle East239 to improve their human rights situations. 
Indeed, the Security Council is a powerful tool for en-
forcing the will of  the international community upon a 
country, since its Resolutions may have binding interna-
tional force.240
Another way of  persuading North Korea to close 
Yodok is by passing a General Assembly Resolution 
which specifically calls for the closing of  Yodok.  The Ge-
neral Assembly has in the past condemned human ri-
ghts violations occurring in other countries, expressing 
concern over the systematic and widespread violations 
of  a citizen’s civil, political, economic, cultural and so-
cial rights, including the use of  torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading punishment.  A GA Resolu-
tion that targets Yodok specifically could raise public 
awareness as to that camp’s horrid and inhumane con-
ditions, although this is dependent largely upon whether 
or not the media chooses to publicize it.
Another effective way of  raising awareness would 
be through the efforts of  an NGO or any other inde-
pendent organization.  Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch, two prominent international human 
rights NGOs, have published reports specifically con-
237  Alston Steiner & Goodman, International Human Rights in 
Context (Oxford University Press 2007).
238  Security Council Resolution 2044, U.N. Security Council. S/
RES/2044, April 2012.
239  Security Council Resolution 2043, U.N. Security Council, S/
RES/2043, April 2012. 
240  Alston Steiner & Goodman, International Human Rights in 
Context (Oxford University Press 2007).
demning the operation of  and torture tactics used in 
Yodok.241  However, it would be even more beneficial 
if  an independent organization dedicated solely to the 
human rights violations in North Korea were to release 
an official report or video, akin to the video produced 
by The Invisible Children earlier this year called “Kony 
2012”, which to date has over 89,000,000 views. 242One 
such group is “Liberty in North Korea”, (“LiNK”), an 
organization dedicated to both raising awareness regar-
ding the dire conditions in North Korea – including 
the existence of  concentration camps – and rescuing 
North Korean refugees.243  If  an organization such as 
LiNK could release a video of  similar production qua-
lity (though hopefully of  more informative value) to 
Kony 2012, then this may empower individuals all over 
the world to start campaigns calling on their govern-
ments – and even on the U.N. – to take a harsher, more 
direct stance with the North Korean Government.  To 
compel North Korea to close the Yodok concentration 
camp, the world must make its closing the human rights 
issue of  our time, and must act with all due haste before 
another human rights issue takes its place. 
241  SEE “Yodok, North Korea – Write for Rights 2011”, Amnes-
ty International, Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://www.amnestyusa.
org/news/multimedia/yodok-north-korea-write-for-rights-2011 
(last visited April 7, 2012) & World Report 2012: North Korea, 
Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/world-
report-2012/world-report-2012-north-korea (last visited April 7, 
2012).
242  Invisiblechildreninc, “KONY 2012”, YouTube, March 5, 
2012, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5
Sqc&feature=results_video&playnext=1&list=PLA186B5D376BF
AC72 (last visited May 14, 2012).
243  LiNK: The North Korea Crisis, available at http://www.link-
global.org/ (last visited May 14, 2012).
